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THE EMPEROR NEEDS NEW CLOTHES:
SECURITIZING THREATS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Volker Franke
Abstract
The terrorist attacks of September 11 brought to a head change that had
been underway since the end of the Cold War in how we think about security:
(1) there is no longer consensus about who or what constitutes the “enemy”;
(2) Realism as the dominating paradigm for studying international relations
is collapsing; (3) domestic factors are gaining importance for devising
security policies; and (4) with increasing globalization these domestic
factors attain impact beyond national borders. In this article, I examine the
nature of these developments and illustrate that the concept of security is
often misapplied for political gain and/or to justify extraordinary measures
for countering impending or perceived threats. Comparing various
conceptions of security, I analyze the dangers resulting from
oversecuritization, which is the propensity to treat traditional policy issues
as existential threats to security, and demonstrate the need to more clearly
define the distinction betw-een nonexistential and existential threats that
justify extraordinary measures. Expanding on classical security complex
theory, I propose a conceptual model that links security sectors and can be
applied to develop measurable criteria for distinguishing between those
issues that should be securitized and those that can be addressed through
existing policy channels.
On that tragic morning of September 11, 2001 when terrorists attacked the
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC,
the world had changed forever. Or at least, so we learned from politicians
and pundits, security experts and pollsters. In his address to a joint session of
Congress on September 20, President George W. Bush described this change:
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war
against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past
136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one
Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but
not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans
have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of
civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night
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fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under
attack.1
While that September morning brought the most vicious attack on U.S.
homeland in history, the world had already begun to change more than a
decade earlier. Speaking about the implications of the end of the Cold War,
then President George H. W. Bush celebrated “a very real prospect of a new
world order” in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in
October 1990. The United Nations, freed from the cold war stalemate, was
finally in a position to fulfill “the historic vision of its founders” (quoted in
Gregg 1993, p. 135) and “unite [its] strength to maintain international peace
and security” (Preamble of the UN Charter).
Although the threat of global thermonuclear war has virtually vanished, the
world has not yet become a safer place. Since George Bush’s UN speech, we
have been witnessing growing ethnic strife and violent quests for selfdetermination, incidents of genocide, mass migration and floods of refugees,
and repeated acts of terrorism. September 11 brought to a tragic head change
that had already been underway for more than a decade. Since the Cold War
ended: (1) there has been no clear consensus about who or what constitutes
the “enemy”; (2) Realism has been losing its stronghold as the dominating
paradigm for studying international relations; (3) domestic factors are
gaining importance for devising security policies; and (4) with increasing
globalization these domestic factors attain impact beyond national borders.
In this article, I examine more closely the nature of these developments and
illustrate that the concept of security is often misapplied for political gain
and/or to justify extraordinary measures for countering impending or
perceived threats. Comparing various conceptions of security, I analyze the
dangers resulting from oversecuritization, which is the propensity to treat
traditional policy issues as existential threats to security, and demonstrate the
need to more clearly define the distinction between nonexistential and
existential threats that justify extraordinary measures. Expanding on classical
security complex theory, I propose a conceptual model that links security
sectors and can be applied to develop measurable criteria for distinguishing
between those issues that should be securitized and those that can be
addressed through existing policy channels.
The Dilemma
Traditionally, studying security has meant focusing on issues such as
national defense, military power, and the use of force. Stephen Walt (1991),
for instance, defined security studies as “the study of the threat, use, and
control of military force” (p. 212). This fairly narrow definition worked well
1

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, last visited
January 8, 2002.
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for scholars working under the shadow of the nuclear threat. Attention
focused primarily on analyzing military hardware and nuclear deterrence and
on doctrines about their use (see Kriesberg 2002). However, over the past
decade the field of security studies has been forced to accommodate new
realities. The relatively peaceful protests and mass anti-government
demonstrations in Prague, Budapest, and East Berlin in the fall of 1989
showed the ability of non-state actors to shape international relations. The
early 1990s also demonstrated that security can no longer be expressed solely
in military terms, as the world has become more interdependent
economically, politically, socially, and culturally. At the same time, a series
of global problems has brought the international community closer together.
Widespread violations of human rights, threats to biodiversity, global
warming, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, and,
recently, the looming threat of terrorism, have severely reduced the ability of
states to solve problems on a purely national basis (Dierks 2001; Lechner &
Boli 2000; Rosenau 1992; Scholte 2000).
Defining Security
Students of international relations have traditionally focused their inquiries
on the study of war and peace. For Realists, threats to the security of a state
manifested themselves in the form of wars. Hobbes’ state of nature, and by
extension, the anarchical structure of the international system, is
characterized by inherent competition over scarce resources and, ultimately,
by states’ inherent quest for power. By nature, human beings (and by
extension states), Realists argue, unconstrained by government and law,
exhibit motives and behaviors that will inevitably lead to war, thereby
threatening the security of all. Consequently, imposing one’s will on the
enemy (before he can subject others to his will) becomes the “natural” means
for gaining and maintaining power and, subsequently, for ensuring safety. Of
course, military might—along with the threat to use it—still proves in many
instances an effective tool of conventional power politics. However, Realists
have conceded that power can also stem from economic capabilities
(Keohane 1984; Keohane & Nye 1977; Waltz 1979). Dependency theorists
went even further and argued that economic inequality itself may be a root
cause for security threats since for as long as “hunger rules peace cannot
prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty” (see
Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980, p. 6;
see also Galtung 1971; Gunder Frank 1984).

Security Sectors
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In his classical security complex theory, Buzan (1991) recognized five
distinct yet overlapping security sectors, each characterized by unique types
of interactions. The military sector revolves around relationships of forceful
coercion; the political sector around authority, governing, and recognition;
the economic sector around relations of trade, production, and finance; the
societal sector around relationships of collective identity; and the
environmental sector around issues related to the planetary biosphere (see
also Buzan et al. 1998).
More specifically, military security describes the interplay of the armed
offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states’ perceptions of each
other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of
states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy.
Stability of governance is seen, for instance, in the democratic ideals of free
and equal opportunity for all citizens to participate, open and fair procedures
for gaining power, and stable structures for the peaceful transfer of power.
Economic security depicts the access to resources and technology, and the
finances and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and
state power. Economic security may be threatened by a widening gap
between rich and poor (states, individuals, classes), modified dependencies
(from the dependency on single or limited commodity trade to service
dependencies ranging from tourism to sex (see Enloe 1990; Steans 1998) and
a growing new divide between the technologically connected and
disconnected (see Rifkin 2000).
Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their
traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and
national identity and custom. The main security objective lies in establishing
peaceful relations among diverse collective identities, i.e., in answering the
questions how can various ethnic, religious, national, or other groups sharing
a common identity live together peacefully (see Rawls 1993)?
Finally, environmental security relates to the maintenance of the local and
planetary biosphere as the essential support system for human existence.
Threats to the environment include global warming, pollution, depletion of
resources, energy and food shortages, extinction of species, and uncontrolled
population growth. More generally, Barnett (2001) explained that
environmental degradation and insecurity are a “product of meta-processes of
development in the industrialized North at the expense of underdevelopment
in the industrializing South” (p. 13, see also Galtung 1971; Gunder Frank
1984). Consequently, environmental insecurity stems from people’s
vulnerability to the effects of environmental degradation, including how that
degradation affects human welfare.
In the mid 1990s the United Nations attempted to broaden the idea of
security to encompass virtually all threats to human existence. Human
security means, “first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and
repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions in the patterns of daily life–whether in homes, in jobs or in

5
communities” (United Nations Development Programme 1994, p. 23). The
1994 UN Development Report specified the following security areas (see
also Paris 2001):
• economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty);
• food security (e.g., access to food);
• health security (e.g., access to health care and protection from
diseases);
• environmental security (e.g., protection from such dangers as
environmental pollution and resource depletion);
• personal security (e.g., physical safety from such things as torture,
war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even
traffic accidents);
• community security (e.g., survival of traditional cultures and ethnic
groups, and the physical security of these groups);
• political security (e.g., enjoyment of civil and political rights, and
freedom from political oppression).
Given the plethora of security concerns circumscribed by the umbrella term
“human security,” Paris (2001), understandably frustrated, concluded that
while “as a political campaign, the human security coalition has…been
successful in a number of specific goals, such as the negotiation of the
landmines convention,” as a new conceptualization of security or as a
framework for understanding the sources of conflict, human security “is so
vague that it verges on meaninglessness—and consequently offers little
practical guidance…to policymakers whose responsibility it is to prioritize
among competing policy goals” (p. 16).
Despite frustration regarding a comprehensive conception of security, a
growing number of observers recognize the need for rethinking what security
means (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan 1991; Kriesberg 2002; Paris 2001), while
others still attempt to hold on to traditional conceptions of security
(Mearsheimer 2001, 1990). Cold War security strategies—shaped by
predictable fears of Communism and Soviet nuclear prowess and an
American determination to control both—promoted deterrence, containment,
military strength, and interventionism. Ironically, America’s “victory” in the
Cold War has removed many of the cornerstones that had imposed structure
and a sense of order in world politics (see Gaddis 1999; Mearsheimer 1990).
Consequently, some authors have bemoaned the collapse of the Cold War
order that had provided somewhat calculable levels of certainty and
predictability. Three texts stand out in this context, all of which share rather
pessimistic predictions for our future.

Three Marker Texts
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In 1989 Francis Fukuyama jubilantly proclaimed the “end of history”
(1992, 1989). He argued that the West’s victory in the Cold War had once
and for all settled ideological differences. According to Fukuyama, the grand
ideological debate was over and there was nothing more to be discussed.
“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as
such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human
government” (1989, p. 4). Fukuyama was convinced that the expanding
number of democratic states would help overcome the conflictual nature of
international anarchy (an assessment widely shared among Democratic Peace
theorists. See Doyle 1986; Müller forthcoming).
Given standard Realist Cold War argumentation, one should have expected
unqualified excitement about the predicted global spread of Western values
and capitalistic market principles. Instead, Fukuyama concluded his article
by lamenting that the end of history was a very sad time that left him longing
for “the time when history existed.” Fukuyama explained:
The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a
purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called
forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by
economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems,
environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated
consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither
art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of
human history. (1989, p. 18)
Half a decade later, Robert Kaplan (2000, first published 1994) published
his notes collected from travels through Eastern Europe and Africa,
suggesting that West Africa was a window for things to come worldwide. His
“coming anarchy” contained “disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime,
scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nationstates and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies,
security firms, and international drug cartels” (p. 7). From these
observations, Kaplan concluded that “[w]e are entering a bifurcated world,”
some parts “inhabited by Hegel’s and Fukuyama’s Last Man, healthy, wellfed, and pampered by technology.” The other, “larger part is inhabited by
Hobbes’s First Man, condemned to a life that is ‘poor, nasty, brutish, and
short. Although both parts will be threatened by environmental stress, the
Last Man will be able to master it; the First Man will not (p. 24).” Although
Kaplan acknowledged and vividly illustrated the severity and global reach of
emerging security threats in the environmental, societal, and political sectors,
he bemoaned a loss of Western control and argued that “in places where the
Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been
mass poverty, people find liberation in violence” (p. 45). The Hobbesian
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nature of the international system is inescapable and aggression and selfinterest will continue to dominate relations between “us” and “them.”
Extending Fukuyama’s conclusion that with the end of the Cold War the
ideological bases for conflict had lost meaning, Samuel Huntington (1993)
argued in his famous Clash of Civilizations that “the great division among
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation
states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different
civilizations” (p. 22). Huntington predicted that the clash of civilizations
would dominate global politics after the Cold War and that conflict between
civilizations would be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the
modern world. Huntington defined civilization as the highest cultural
grouping of people and broadest cultural identity short of what distinguishes
humans from other species. In the post Cold War world, he argued, people
would define their identity in ethnic and religious terms. The ideological
divide that had characterized the Cold War was giving way to “us” vs.
“them” relations between people and members of different cultures,
ultimately pitting the West against the Rest.
What To Do…
The “end of history” and the “coming anarchy” signify not only the
emergence of new security threats, but also manifest a profound assault on
those theoretical premises that have served Realists well for explaining
international relations for more than 2,000 years. Understandably, Realists
attempt to develop solutions for emerging problems based on their timetested assumptions. Huntington, for instance, provides a number of
recommendations for what the West should do to address civilizational
security threats (notice, all of them presume the conflictual nature of human
relations and promote the “us” versus “them” dichotomy that has
traditionally informed Realist scholarship). His recommendations include:
(1) maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; (2) exploit
differences among other civilizations; (3) support civilization groups
sympathetic to Western values and interests; (4) strengthen international
institutions that reflect Western values and interests; and (5) promote
involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.
The clash of civilizations presents Huntington’s attempt to safe Western
identity for which Realism has traditionally provided the normative
framework. Now that the Cold War is over and the enemy has vanished,
Huntington wonders who the next enemy might be. After all, since human
relations are, by their very nature, conflictual, we need a new enemy to
continue our competition over scarce resources. Therefore, constructing
“threats” becomes part of constructing the “other.” Effective “othering”
oftentimes involves the use of stereotypes, which are often thrust upon those
(the “other” or the enemy) whom we wish to silence, dehumanize, or
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securitize (see Allport 1971; Abrams & Hogg 1999; Prins 1998; Tajfel
1978). While a more detailed examination of the dynamic between
securitization, stereotyping and enemy imaging is beyond the scope of this
article, future research should explore conflict strategies based on
securitization of the “other” and examine the extent to which politicized
(instead of securitized) response mechanisms could deescalate conflict.
What Else To Do…
As this brief excursion demonstrates, the most prominent policy
recommendations derived over the past decade have left intact the very
assumptions that informed the prevalent theoretical explanations and policy
options of the Cold War. Yet, global security in the aftermath of
thermonuclear threat is about more than just advanced weapons technology
and military competition. But we can no longer simply add new security
sectors and still make our explanations stick. Rather, it is essential to
profoundly revise the premises and the scope, and to overcome the
stereotypes that have informed our thinking about security. Security threats
are not universal nor do they apply objectively to actors worldwide.
Security today encompasses a wide array of sectors and actors. Buzan and
colleagues (1998) argued that security is about survival, meaning the level at
which an issue poses “an existential threat to a designated referent object
(traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government,
territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use
of extraordinary measures to handle them” (p. 21). Traditionally, the referent
object of security has been the state, threatened primarily militarily by some
peer competitor (see Schwarz & Layne 2002; Mearsheimer 2001; Keohane &
Nye 1977). Politically, existential threats may be viewed as challenges to
constituting principles, especially sovereignty and perhaps even state
ideology. The state may also be a referent object in the other sectors, but is
much less likely to be threatened in its very existence. Economically, for
instance, firms are the most common referent objects—threatened by
bankruptcy. Crises to a national economy absent a war are only rare
occasions. In fact, the largest bankruptcies in American history (Enron,
Worldcom) have not threatened the survival of the American economy.
The primary referent object in the societal sector are collectivities formed
around a shared identity independent of the state. The recent events in the
Kosovo region of Yugoslavia illustrate this. Under the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution, Kosovo became an autonomous province within Serbia. From
the late 1980s Kosovo faced growing Serb nationalist sentiments. Slobodan
Milosevic, who had gained power in Serbia in 1987, revoked Kosovar
autonomy in 1990, dissolved the Kosovo Provincial Assembly and
Government, removed Kosovo Albanians from important state posts, and
declared a state of emergency. Growing Albanian resistance to rule from
Belgrade led to attacks against Serbian security forces by the Kosovo
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Liberation Army (KLA) in the mid-1990s. Belgrade responded with military
repression of the Kosovar population as a whole. By mid September 1998 an
estimated 250,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes and
some 50,000 were still in the open as the winter approached. It was clear
many might die. Despite the extent of the human tragedy, the international
community waited until the spring of 1999 before it recognized the potential
security implications for the European Community (legitimized as a
traditional state actor referent object) and responded with air strikes which
eventually lead to the capitulation of the Milosovic regime.2
These examples illustrate that security takes “politics beyond the
established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of
politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 23). Any issue, so the
upshot of this argument, can be securitized, i.e., presented as an existential
threat that requires immediate attention, oftentimes in form of emergency
measures. According to classical complex security theory (see Buzan et al.
1998; Buzan 1991), any public issue can be located along a spectrum (see
Figure 1) ranging from non-politicized (i.e., the state does not deal with the
issue and is not made part of the public discourse on the issue) through
politicized (i.e., the issue is part of public policy and thus requires
government decision and resource allocations or, in some cases, some form
of communal governance) to securitized (i.e., the issue is presented as an
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions
outside normal political procedure).
FIGURE 1: Spectrum of Securitization
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
non-politicized

politicized

securitized

For example, religion is politicized in some states (e.g., Iran, Saudi-Arabia)
but not in others (e.g., Germany, France); some states securitize culture (Iran,
the former Soviet Union) while others don’t (the United Kingdom or the
Netherlands). Similarly, the writers of our three marker texts have clearly
securitized culture or civilization. Using speech act theory (see Austin 1975;
Bourdieu 1991), Buzan et al. (1998) argued that a discourse that presents
something as an existential threat to the referent object does not by itself
create securitization, but is only a securitizing move. The issue is securitized
if and when the audience accepts it as such. Buzan et al. identified two
dangers: (1) opportunities for power holders to exploit threats for domestic
purposes (e.g., Reagan’s invasion of Grenada following the 1983 suicide
2

A detailed account of the events can be found at
http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/account/intro.htm.
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truck bomb that killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut bombing or, concomitant
the Lewinski scandal, Clinton’s bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan in
response to terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in
1998); and (2) attempts to securitize not because an immediate existential
threat exists, but merely to gain “tactical attention,” e.g., for environmental
problems. The danger lies in the fact that issues may be securitized whenever
there is a failure to address them (at least with the desired outcome) through
normal politics.
The Danger of Oversecuritization
Securitizing everything from nuclear missiles to miniskirts and pop music
(as is the case in the former Soviet Union, Iran, or the Taliban’s Afghanistan)
suffocates civil society, jeopardizes democracy, and creates coercive states
whose only legitimacy stems from countering ever increasing security threats
(see Buzan et al. 1998). Therefore, avoiding excessive securitization
becomes as important as widening our understanding of what security means.
The tendency to oversecuritize issues of public policy is quite common as a
few examples from the American context illustrate. These examples show the
intricate overlap between security sectors and suggest that the perceived need
to securitize an issue in one sector may produce a threat in another sector.
SEMATECH. Capitalism strives on the fact that the main actors—firms and
workers/ employees—feel insecure. After all, insecurity in terms of market
shares and employment produces market efficiencies. But what happens
when the forces present in a global free market produce outcomes that
threaten the security of the state? By the mid-1980s, the U.S. electronics
industry had lost its global market dominance partially due to government
supported research and development activities by overseas competitors.
Concerned about the growing dependence on foreign supplied
semiconductors and components for advanced weaponry, the Reagan
Administration supported industrial policy efforts to reinvigorate the U.S.
semiconductor industry, recapture the market, and assure that the American
military could rely on domestic chip manufacturers. The government
promoted the establishment of a non-profit consortium of U.S.
semiconductor manufacturers, known as SEMATECH (SEMiconductor
MAnufacturing TECHnology), which, in conjunction with government
agencies and universities were to sponsor and conduct research aimed at
assuring U.S. leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology (see
O’Keefe & Franke 2002). While the most prominent manufacturers joined
the consortium, some 200 smaller chip-makers stayed out, steered off by the
financial requirements or because they feared the larger companies would
dominate the research agenda. In addition, some critics argued, by helping
one set of companies, SEMATECH effectively shut out those manufacturers
whose products and research ideas it opted not to support.
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TRP. Convinced that SEMATECH had been a success, the Clinton
administration modeled its 1993 Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP)
initiative for developing dual-use defense technology largely after that
experience (see O’Keefe & Franke 2002). The perceived earlier success of
merging private and public resources into the SEMATECH consortium to
produce internationally competitive semiconductors encouraged the Clinton
administration in its efforts to pursue the development of dual-use
technology through partnering arrangements between the public and private
sectors. Quickly TRP renewed the controversy over the economic priorities
of government policies, raising questions of whether the government should
directly interfere in domestic market competition by sponsoring specific
R&D efforts to help promote the competitiveness of the U.S. defense
industry in the global marketplace. While one can easily point to increased
levels of military security by reducing dependencies on imported
technologies, government interference in the market presents a direct threat
to firms or entire industrial sectors that do not benefit from government
contracting.
The International Space Station. As the Clinton administration took power
in 1993, national security officials became aware that Russia was about to
transfer rocket technology to India. It appeared that the U.S. might well have
to impose severe trade sanctions to head off or punish Russia for missile
proliferation. However, instead, the Clinton administration decided to bring
Russia aboard international efforts to build a space station, thereby linking
business relations with the requirement that Russia would abide by the
Missile Technology Control Regime.3 With the collapse of the Soviet Union
and economic downturn accompanied by continuous deficit spending, space
policy was declining both in national prominence and in its importance for
national security (as a symbol of global technological dominance). What
would justify multi-billion dollar expenditures absent superpower rivalry?
Would exploration for science’s sake be enough? The decision for space
cooperation securitized the space station by linking it directly with U.S.
foreign policy objectives and, at the same time aided NASA in gaining
funding to keep the program alive (see Lambright 2001).
The State of the Union. Most recently the Bush administration has
attempted to link domestic policy objectives with efforts to curb terrorism.
Unquestionably the Bush administration is preoccupied with waging war on
terrorism, thereby running the risk of oversecuritizing policy issues that
present neither an existential threat nor require extraordinary measures. In his
State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President Bush focused

3

This meant specifically that Russia could provide India with rocket engines (the
product), but not with the know-how of how to make them (the process). See
Lambright 2001.
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primarily on his administration’s efforts to “win the war on terror.”4
Conveniently, since public support for his foreign policy performance is at an
unprecedented high, the president linked his domestic policy agenda directly
to his war efforts, stating that “…we will win this war, we will protect our
homeland, and we will revive our economy.” From his discussion of military
and homeland security, Bush moved directly to promoting his economic
security plan, which he “summed up in one word: jobs. Good jobs begin with
good schools, and here we’ve made a fine start…”
Bush continued his address with a call for a new culture of responsibility,
culminating in the unveiling of the USA Freedom Corps, designed to focus
on “three areas of need: responding in case of crisis at home, rebuilding our
communities, and extending American compassion throughout the world.”
As discussed above, societal security concerns the ability of societies to
reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and
religious and national identity and custom. The main security objective lies
in establishing peaceful relations among diverse collective identities. Instead
of promoting cultural diversity, securitizing values threatens the legitimacy
of non-Western normative and cultural societal frames, directly translating
the “us” versus “them” mentality that inspired our three marker texts into
political praxis. President Bush suggested that “America will lead by
defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging
for all people everywhere.” He continued, and this demonstrates the reach of
oversecuritization, “we have no intention of imposing our culture, but
America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human
dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women,
private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance.” Again,
by securitizing everything security looses its substantive meaning.
The War on Drugs. During the 2002 Super Bowl, the president’s Office of
National Drug Control Policy aired a commercial linking illegal narcotics
trade to terrorism. While previous anti-drug messages focused on how users
harm themselves, the Super Bowl commercial claimed that money to
purchase drugs is likely to end up in the hands of terrorists and narcocriminals. Focus groups conducted before the add aired revealed a “strong
decline in intension to use” among teenagers and showed considerable
support among parents who found the commercials a “‘powerful way to
initiate conversations’ with their children” (Ahrens 2002, p. A3).
Farm Subsidies. Speaking to a convention of ranchers in February 2002,
President Bush declared crop and cattle production to be a national security
issue, providing a fresh rationale for continuing farm subsidies. “This nation
has got to eat,” Bush told the crowd. “It’s in our national security interests
that we be able to feed ourselves. Thank goodness, we don’t have to rely on
somebody else’s meat to make sure our people are healthy and well-fed”
4

For the text of the State of the Union Address see Washington Post, January 30,
2002, p. A-16.
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(Allen 2002, p. A4). Bush’s attempt to securitize cattle farming lead even
staunch conservative commentators like George F. Will (2002) to remark that
“President Bush tiptoed to the edge of parody” (p. A33).
The Budget. The Bush Administration’s tendency to oversecuritize
government policy objectives can be seen in its FY 2003 budget that shows
significant increases in proposed expenditures for homeland security efforts.
While this is to be expected in the aftermath of September 11, some budget
experts caution that “spending could get out of hand as agency heads rush to
seek more money by cloaking their mission in the mantle of homeland
security” (Pianin & Miller 2002, p. A7). As Robert Bixby of the budget
watchdog group Concord Coalition explained, “It will be very tempting for
agencies to redefine their missions under homeland security and for almost
any member of Congress to explain an add-on or earmark as a matter of
homeland security” (quoted in Pianin & Miller 2002, p. A7).
What This Means…
The Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict, the nuclear muscle-flexing by
India, Pakistan, and North Korea, Argentina’s economic collapse and
continuing European integration, global warming and ozone depletion, drug
trafficking and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases,
and, most recently, America’s war on terrorism illustrate that threats to
security in the 21st century will take on various forms and will require
interdependent responses that both link security sectors and bring together
the range of actors shaping international politics. In these pages, I have
argued that in a world that admittedly is becoming more dangerous in many
areas, the concept of security is often misapplied for political gain and/or to
justify extraordinary measures for countering impending or perceived threats.
The examples above illustrate the dangers of oversecuritization and
demonstrate the need to more clearly define the distinction between
nonexistential and existential threats that justify extraordinary measures. In
the following section I attempt to develop a framework for determining the
existentiality of threats and for deciding on appropriate responses (either
through existing policy response mechanisms or extraordinary measures).
A New Framework for Determining Threats
Measuring the respective impact of various issues threatening
sustainability, Dovers (1995) developed a framework for assessing the
magnitude of security threats that can be adapted to examining the severity or
existentiality of possible challenges across security sectors and to
determining the most appropriate types of responses. According to Dovers’
model, three parameters—time, space, and impact—help determine the
magnitude of security threats. More specifically, Dovers identified six
problem-framing attributes that are useful for developing criteria for
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distinguishing between issues that should be securitized and those that could
be handled through existing political response mechanisms. The more highly
problems rate across parameters, the more severely they are thought to
impact upon security:
1. Spatial scale of cause and effect, describing the “spread” of the issue
across political boundaries, assuming that the more diffuse causes
and/or effects are, the more difficult it will be to rely on clearly
defined political response mechanisms. For instance, climate change
is a much more diffuse policy issue (and potential security threat)
than solid waste management or weapons proliferation.
2. Magnitude of possible impacts, referring to “the degree of ‘damage’
in a worst-case scenario relative to the whole of the entity impacted
upon” (Dovers 1995, p. 96). For instance, smaller changes in
economic productivity (due to seasonal variations) are less serious
than larger changes (due to recession or a stock market crash).
3. Temporal scale of possible impacts, distinguishing on the one hand
between immediate, near-term impacts and very far-off impacts and,
on the other hand, between discrete, short-term effects and longterm, lasting impacts (of, for instance, storage of nuclear waste or
preemptively striking Iraq).
4. Reversibility and the assumption that irreversible or very costly
impacts (e.g., the loss of a particular species or the effects of nuclear
war) are more severe than more easily reversible and less costly
impacts (e.g., development of alternative energy sources or
adjustment of consumer behavior).
5. Mensurability, describing the degree to which we actually
comprehend and can measure relevant impacts and processes
pertinent to the problem. Dovers distinguishes between “wellknown” cause-effect associations; “risk” where we can at least assign
trustworthy probabilities to possible outcomes; “uncertainty” where
only the general nature and direction of outcomes are understood;
and “ignorance” where outcomes are “unknown, unguessable, or can
only be speculated upon” (p. 97).
6. Degree of complexity and connectivity, establishing a continuum
ranging from discrete issues to highly complex issues featuring
multiple feedbacks and possible threshold effects. Issues scoring
highly on this attribute include, for instance, climate change,
population-environment linkages, or globalization and the
democratization-development dynamic.
In addition to these problem-framing attributes, Dovers provides a further
filter for identifying the magnitude of problems and prioritizing policy
responses. He distinguishes problems at three levels:
1. Micro-problems are “spatially and temporally discrete; not overly
complex or fraught with uncertainty; not requiring large resource
commitment or the development of new mechanisms or policy
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processes for redress; and, if particularly topical, then only on a local
or sectoral scale or are so despite lack of substantive evidence” (p.
100). Problems on the micro-level can typically be resolved on a
case-by-case basis within existing institutional arrangements and
policy processes (e.g., settling of labor disputes, trade negotiations,
crime prevention).
2. Meso-problems are significant and may be prominent on the public
agenda, but “do not pose systemic threats to the present pattern of
production and consumption, or overwhelming challenges to existing
policy processes” (p. 100). Major issues fully addressable within one
country may fall into this category (e.g., national air pollution
emission standards, social security provisions).
3. Macro-problems present threats that are “multifaceted, complex,
fraught with uncertainties and ignorances, spatially and temporally
diffuse, highly connected to other issues (or security sectors, VF) and
threaten major possible disruption of human or natural systems” (p.
100). Again, climate change, resource scarcity, the spread of
infectious diseases, the widening gap between rich and poor,
developed and underdeveloped, technologically connected and the
disconnected, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
wars of all kinds (in an increasingly interdependent world) present
macro-problems of varying magnitude.
Applying both problem-framing attributes and problem levels to the
examples discussed above illustrate the threat distortion caused by
oversecuritization. Both SEMATECH and TRP adressed national-scale
meso-level issues by employing problem-resolution mechanisms based on
existing or easily adaptable industrial policy strategies. Overall, global
market competition and the significant defense drawdown of the early 1990s
presented moderate, near- to medium-term, and fairly easily reversible
threats to the economic (and by extension military) security of the United
States, and risks were fairly well-known in each case. Although the issues of
dual-use technology and, more generally, industrial policy are fairly complex
and can span across security sectors, these examples show that remedies
were found through existing policy channels.
The Missile Technology Control Regime and the International Space
Station provided bilateral/international policy responses to threats whose
potential impact can be judged as moderate to severe and medium (in terms
of timing) and medium to long-term (in terms of longevity), difficult and
certainly expensive to reverse, with somewhat uncertain risks and a high
degree of complexity and connectivity. Still, the U.S. and Russia were able to
address the security threat (weapons technology proliferation) through
establishing a new regime for dealing with this issue. Therefore, the ISS can
be viewed as an instance of a fairly typical international policy resolution
mechanism, but not as an extraordinary measure.
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The war on drugs and farm subsidies differ in their spatial impact (regional
versus national), but both policies respond to minor threats with short-term
and fairly obvious impacts. Interestingly, attempts to reduce the influx of
illegal drugs into the United States, Plan Colombia, the U.S. backed and
partially funded Colombian government initiative is pushing indigenous
peoples toward the brink. U.S. military aid has intensified militarization and
provoked a surge in rural violence. At the same time, U.S. backed crop
fumigation is destroying small-scale agriculture and highly biodiverse
rainforest ecosystems (see Lloyd & Soltani 2001; Wilson 2001). Thus, policy
measures designed to boost U.S. security pose immediate and severe threats
to the economic, political and environmental security of the population in
that region.
By contrast to the examples discussed above, climate change,
sustainability, nuclear war, and terrorism present threats that are international
to global in scale, with long-term, potentially catastrophic and irreversible
impacts on both natural and human systems and high levels of mensurability
and complexity. As the war on terrorism and the recent conference on
sustainability in South Africa illustrate, no policy channels are currently in
place to effectively counter these threats and, given the severity of these
threats, extraordinary measures may be called for.
Discussion and Conclusions
The purpose of this article was to sketch a preliminary model for
distinguishing between existential and nonexistential threats and,
consequently, to provide suggestions for how to decide which threats can to
be addressed using existing policy mechanisms and which may require
extraordinary measures. While a more specific quantification of threat
potentials is beyond the scope of this article, future research should develop
more concrete measures for operationalizing threats. For instance, building
further on Dovers (1995) sustainability framework, such research could
weigh the various impacts and apply the emerging measures to very specific
security threats. Such research could be of great benefit for scholars
interested in tracking and predicting potential security threats and policy
makers charged with appropriating finite resources to deterring, preventing
or, when necessary, countering threats.
During the Cold War international relations were overshadowed by the
threat of thermonuclear war. As existential as this threat was, it forced states
to cooperate not only with regard to strategic arms limitations but also in
political and economic sectors. The end of the Cold War has not ridded the
world of existential threats. In fact, the threat of a nuclear holocaust merely
masked other existential threats during the Cold War (every other threat
received a lower ranking on the security continuum, see Figure 1). With the
end of the Cold War we can now shift our focus to those neglected threats,
reassess their importance, and decide whether to respond through existing or
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develop new policy mechanisms or whether a threat requires extraordinary
response measures. It should be in states’ interest to cooperate on tackling
those security problems that present existential threats to all of them. A nonexclusive list includes: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stability
of governance, the ever-widening gap between rich and poor (states,
individuals, classes), the emerging divide between the technologically
connected and the disconnected (see Rifkin 2000), global warming,
pollution, depletion of resources, increasing energy demands, improving
education and health, and population control and food security.
Security can no longer be defined in state-only terms. International
relations are shaped by non-state actors and security concerns span across
sectors and link various security communities. International actors (states,
groups, firms, organizations, individuals) of various types may share the
same existential concerns and may find that cooperating alongside others
who share those concerns may benefit all of them. During the Cold War,
everybody shared the fear of thermonuclear war. Today, in a world
characterized by globalization and interdependence, actors may share
common interests in preserving the biosphere, safeguarding the free market,
preventing the further spread of infectious diseases, and, most visibly since
September 11, combating terrorism.
The more it will be possible to promote communication and build
cooperation among actors (state and non-state) and across sectors, the more
regularized patterns of behavior and relationships will become and,
consequently, the more actors may focus on shared interests. As a result, the
more trust may be established and the closer we may come to attaining peace
as a goal in international relations.
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